Estimates of the welfare costs of inflation based on Bailey's (1956) methodology are typically computed on the basis of aggregate money demand models. Yet, the behavior of money demand is likely to vary across sectors. As a result, the impact on welfare of changes in the inflation regime may differ between households and firms. We specifically investigate the sectoral welfare implications of the shift from the Great Inflation to the present regime of low and stable inflation. In order to do so, we estimate different functional specifications of sectoral money demand models for US households and non-financial firms using flow of funds data covering four decades. We find that the benefits were significant for both households and firms.
Introduction

1
At the height of the Great In ‡ation in 1980, the three-month T-bill interest rate stood at 15%. By the end of the 1990s, it had declined by around twothirds. There is general consensus that moving from a regime in which one of the closest empirical proxies for a short-term risk-free rate was a double-digit rate to one in which both nominal interest rates and in ‡ation are low and stable has yielded substantial welfare bene…ts. Indeed, a substantial body of literature has shown that high and volatile in ‡ation entails a number of economic and social costs, mainly arising from the ine¢ cient allocation of resources due to increased uncertainty and distortions to relative prices. Additional sources of welfare costs associated with in ‡ation include high risk premia, the interaction between in ‡ation and the tax code, ine¢ cient distraction of resources from production of goods to …nancial activities, lower capital accumulation and arbitrary redistribution of wealth (see for instance Dri¢ ll et al., 1990, and Fischer, 1995) .
A speci…c source of in ‡ation-related welfare costs -the so-called "shoeleather costs" -arises when agents ine¢ ciently manage their holdings of monetary balances for transaction purposes because of in ‡ation. The traditional way to measure the welfare loss arising from "shoe-leather costs" is based on the methodology by Bailey (1956) . He suggests that such costs can be measured by the area underlying the inverse money demand function, which represents the lost consumer surplus (net of seigniorage revenues) that could be gained from reducing the positive nominal interest rate to zero. Intuitively, the rationale is that -assuming that monetary balances yield direct utility via liquidity services and that higher nominal interest rates increase the opportunity cost of holding monetary balances -higher expected in ‡ation will lead to agents ine¢ ciently economising on their monetary balances, via its impact on nominal interest rates.
A large number of studies have used Bailey's approach to estimate the welfare costs of in ‡ation arising from distortions to money demand. For instance, Fischer (1981) estimates the cost of a 10% in ‡ation rate at around 0.3% of US GNP per year. A review by Gillman (1995) reports signi…cantly larger estimates, ranging between 0.85% and 3% of US income, for the same in ‡ation rate. More recently, an in ‡uential study by Lucas (2000) using annual data covering most of the twentieth century argues that the welfare gains from reducing in ‡ation could be signi…cant. In particular, reducing the annual in ‡ation rate from 10% to zero would lead to welfare gains of slightly less than 1% of GNP per year in perpetuity. By contrast, a paper by Ireland (2009) , focusing on the sample 1980-2004, concludes that the welfare gains from eliminating in ‡ation altogether would be signi…cantly lower in the current monetary regime of low interest rates. Likewise, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) suggest that the welfare costs at low in ‡ation rates are limited, once one takes into account changes in portfolio allocation behavior across in ‡ation regimes. 2 Estimations of the welfare costs of in ‡ation are usually based on aggregate money demand functions, i.e. equations representing the equilibrium demand for real monetary holdings for the US economy as a whole. 3 Yet, Goldfeld (1976) and Jain and Moon (1994) show that money demand behavior signi…-cantly di¤ers between US households and …rms. Indeed, di¤erences in terms of motives for demanding monetary holdings, cash management practices, patterns of usage of banking and …nancial products, access to alternative payments technology, etc. are likely to result in di¤erent sectoral responses to variations in the key money demand determinants, such as scale variables and opportunity cost measures.
Thus, one would expect that the welfare costs associated with high in ‡a-tion should also di¤er across the di¤erent sectors of the economy. This issue is important since it implies that di¤erent categories of agents may have a di¤erent assessment of the welfare losses associated with high-in ‡ation or, conversely, of the welfare gains arising from moving to a low in ‡ation regime. In particular, there is consensus that the end of the Great Disin ‡ation and the shift to the present low in ‡ation regime has yielded substantial welfare gains to the population at large, but we do not know much about how the magnitude of these bene…ts compares across di¤erent sectors.
The purpose of this paper is speci…cally to analyse the welfare impact for 2 Based on household survey data, the authors argue that when interest rates are low, the interest rate elasticity of aggregate money demand becomes very small since only a limited fraction of households participates in …nancial markets due to the reduced incentive to hold interest-bearing assets. As a result, when nominal interest rates are close to zero, money demand hardly reacts to changes in interest rates, so that reducing in ‡ation can no longer bring signi…cant welfare gains via its stimulating e¤ect on monetary balances. 3 Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin's (2000) study on US households is an exception.
households and …rms of the modern disin ‡ation using Bailey's methodology. In order to do so, we perform a sectoral analysis of the welfare costs of in‡ation using di¤erent speci…cations of money demand models for households and …rms estimated on the basis of ‡ow-of-funds data over the period from 1959 to 2006. To preview our results, we estimate stable long-run money demand relationships for both sectors and we …nd that both households and …rms bene…ted signi…cantly from moving to the present low in ‡ation regime. The welfare gains represent a greater share of the transaction variable for households than …rms; however, once rescaled to a common transaction variable, the welfare gains of the two sectors turn out to be of a comparable size. In addition, our aggregate results are closer to the in ‡ation costs reported by Fischer (1981) and Ireland (2009) than those by Lucas (2000) . The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we brie ‡y recall Bailey's approach to the measurement of the welfare cost of in ‡ation. Section 3 deals with some relevant data issues. Section 4 presents the results of estimates of a double-log and a semi-log money demand function for both US households and …rms. Section 5 evaluates the welfare gains from reducing in ‡ation to zero and Section 6 draws some conclusions.
Money demand and welfare
An issue that has received signi…cant attention in the literature on the welfare costs of in ‡ation is the choice of functional form for the long-run money demand relationship. The two main competing speci…cations are: 1) Meltzer's (1963) log-log function and 2) Cagan's (1956) semi-log function. The log-log function is speci…ed as follows:
where m are monetary balances, y is a measure of the volume of transactions, r is the nominal interest rate (the opportunity cost of holding the non-interest bearing asset), A > 0 is a constant, and denote the elasticities (in absolute values) with respect to the transaction variable and the interest rate, respectively. Money and scale variables are typically measured in real terms. Similarly, the semi-log function is as follows:
where B > 0 is a constant and denotes the absolute value of the interest rate semi-elasticity. Applying Bailey's method to the log-log money demand function (1), we obtain the following measure of the welfare costs associated with a positive nominal interest rate r: w(r) = Ay 
while the corresponding measure for the semi-log money demand equation (2) takes the form:
In practical terms, these measures -the so-called "welfare triangles"-are obtained as integrals of the inverse money demand function (i.e. expressed as function of the nominal interest rate) on the interval [0; r]. A positive value of the nominal interest rate as a result of expected in ‡ation implies a positive opportunity cost of holding money and leads to the monetary balances of agents falling below their optimal level. 4 Thus, the "welfare triangle" measures the consumer surplus lost by agents by ine¢ ciently foregoing services provided by money in facilitating exchanges because of in ‡ation. Also note that the welfare costs due to living in an economy where the steady state interest rate is r instead of zero are expressed as fractions of the transaction variable.
When the elasticity of money with respect to the transaction variable ( ) is unitary, the transaction variable drops out of (3) and (4) and, given the estimated parameters of the money demand function, the computation of the welfare triangles for any given level of interest rate is straightforward. When the elasticity is di¤erent from one, a value of the transaction variable must be speci…ed in order to be able to calculate the welfare costs (Gillman, 1995) . Lucas (2000) argues that the log-log functional form (1) provides a superior description of the historical behavior of US money demand and a more precise calculation of the welfare costs of in ‡ation, particularly at low interest rates. In addition, he notes that, in the framework of the shopping-time model of money demand determination by McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) and for reasonable estimates of the interest rate elasticity, the log-log money demand equation is consistent with inventory-theoretic money demand models, such as the Baumol-Tobin model. Chadha et al. (1998) concur on the theoretical superiority of the log-log form. Also using McCallum and Goodfriend's model, these authors show that the choice of any well-behaved utility function and transactions technology (e.g. Cobb-Douglas, CES and translog functions) is likely to result in a log-log speci…cation of long-run money demand.
While theoretical considerations and secular empirical evidence seem to support the log-log functional form, Ireland (2009) has recently argued that the post-1980 data are better described by a semi-log function. In the author's view, the monetary policy regime shift following the appointment of Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1979 and the reforms to the regulatory framework introduced by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act in 1980 led to a shift in money demand behavior warranting a change in the preferred speci…cation.
As our study focuses on a sample period which entirely comprises that examined by Ireland (1980 Ireland ( -2006 , but is shorter and only partly overlapping with Lucas' (1900 Lucas' ( -1994 , it is di¢ cult to tell ex-ante which of the two alternative speci…cations is likelier to prove more appropriate. Thus, in the empirical analysis we consider both speci…cations and we separately assess their associated welfare cost functions.
Data issues
The empirical exercise is based on a sample period spanning from the …rst quarter of 1959 (the earliest date for which data on sectoral monetary holding are available) to the fourth quarter of 2006. Since we want to study the welfare gains of the modern disin ‡ation for di¤erent sectors of the US economy, it is important to ascertain whether this sample period adequately captures the shift from the double-digit in ‡ation rates during the Great In ‡a-tion to the present regime of low and stable in ‡ation. The sample pre-dates the switch to the Great In ‡ation by around one decade, indicating that the starting date is adequate. In addition, based on a review of econometric estimates of trend in ‡ation and surveys on in ‡ation expectations, Mishkin (2007) argues that the process of disin ‡ation and the re-anchoring of long-term in-‡ation expectations was completed by the end of the 1990s, suggesting that the ending date of our sample adequately captures the return to a regime of low and stable in ‡ation. More generally, the chosen horizon provides a su¢ ciently long coverage of periods of both high and low in ‡ation to allow to draw conclusions about money demand behavior across di¤erent in ‡ation regimes.
Sectoral data on holdings of monetary assets by households and non…nancial corporations are sourced from the Federal Reserve Board's ‡ow of funds accounts. These accounts include statistical information on aggregate sectoral holdings of checkable deposits and currency, by households and nonpro…t organizations (Table L.100) and by non-…nancial …rms (Table L. 
101).
Monetary data are available at a quarterly frequency and refer to end-ofperiod outstanding amounts and have been seasonally adjusted using the X12-ARIMA seasonal adjustment method. Real balances are obtained by dividing monetary holdings by GDP de ‡ator.
The aggregation of checkable deposits and currency corresponds to the de…nition of the monetary aggregate M1 used by Lucas (2000) . As for the scale variables, following Jain and Moon (1994), we rely on business sector GDP for …rms and personal consumption expenditures for households. Business sector GDP is given by US GDP excluding gross value added of households, of non-pro…t institutions serving households and of general government. Personal consumption expenditure is a measure of goods and services purchased by US residents. Annualised seasonally adjusted nominal data (in US billions) on business GDP and consumption expenditures are available at a quarterly frequency from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (Tables 1.3.5 and 2.1, respectively), together with the corresponding price index (Tables 1.3.4 and 2.3.4) . Finally, the interest rate is the period average of the rate of return on the three-month Treasury bill, sourced from the Federal Reserve Board, and is expressed in percentage points.
An important issue related to the data on monetary holdings is the need to control for the e¤ect on households'checkable deposits of the wide use of retail deposit sweep programs by banks. As explained by Anderson (1995 Anderson ( , 2003 , in order to economise on their statutory reserve requirements, starting from January 1994 US banks have used software programmes that "sweep" funds from demand deposits (that are subject to statutory reserve requirements) to money market deposit accounts (a type of savings accounts and, therefore, subject to a zero percent reserve ratio) at the end of each business day. The sweep movements performed by banks involve only re-classi…cations of the balances in their customers'accounts rather than shifts in the demand for money from economic agents, who are likely to perceive themselves to own signi…cantly larger holdings of transaction deposits than reported by banks in their balance sheets. Therefore, in order to understand the money demand behavior of US households, it is essential to add the estimated amount of transaction deposits involved in the retail sweep programs to the holdings of checkable deposits reported in the ‡ow-of-funds statistics. In this paper we use the estimates of transaction deposits a¤ected by the retail sweep programs documented in detail in Cynamon et al. (2006) , 5 that have been used in previous empirical money demand studies (e.g. Dutkowsky and Cynamon, 2003 , and Ireland, 2009 ).
Sectoral money demand
Equilibrium money demand relationships are conventionally estimated in a cointegration analysis framework. As a preliminary step, the statistical properties of the variables are examined using standard unit root tests (augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron) as well as the KPSS stationarity test. The results -not reported for the sake of brevity -suggest that over the considered sample period all the variables can be modelled as I(1) in levels.
We test for cointegration using two sets of single-equation tests: (1) the error-correction model (ECM) tests by Zivot (1994) as described by Maddala and Kim (1998) ; and (2) the Phillips-Ouliaris (1990) residual-based tests. The …rst Zivot test involves the preliminary estimation of a two-step error correction model. The null-hypothesis of no cointegration is then tested by means of a standard t-test of the signi…cance of the loading factor of the error correction term. Under the second Zivot test, the ECM is estimated in a single step and the null hypothesis of no cointegration is tested by applying a standard Wald test to the restriction that the variables forming the cointegrating vector can be jointly excluded from the model. The PhillipsOuliaris residual-based tests are conducted by applying the Phillips-Perron Z t and Z q unit root tests to the residuals of the estimated equilibrium equation speci…ed as in (1) or (2) . Under the null hypothesis, the residuals contain a unit root and the equation does not represent a cointegrating relationship.
The results of the Zivot tests indicate strong evidence of cointegration for both households and …rms, regardless of the choice of speci…cation ( Table 1) . The evidence is less uniform across sectors and functional speci…cations when the Phillips-Ouliaris tests are used. Indeed, the results of the tests seem to provide more robust evidence of cointegration for households and …rms, when the semi-log speci…cation is used. By contrast, when the log-log speci…cation is used, the null of no cointegration can be rejected only for households (and in this case at a lower signi…cance level than for the semi-log speci…cation). We use Choi et al.'s (2008) Hausman-type test to further investigate the log-log speci…cations, for which the results of the Phillips-Ouliaris test were either not entirely clear-cut (in the case of households) or unfavorable (in the case of …rms). The results of the Hausman-type test support the existence of cointegration for the household sector under the log-log speci…cation. By contrast, they provide evidence against the null hypothesis of cointegration for the …rm sector when the log-log speci…cation is used. 7 Overall, the results of our cointegration analysis using di¤erent tests is fairly supportive of the existence of cointegration for the household sector, regardless of the speci…cation used. As regards the corporate sector, the empirical evidence is fairly robust for the semi-log speci…cation, but weaker for the log-log speci…cation.
We estimate the long-run sectoral equilibrium money demand functions for households and …rms under both functional speci…cations (1) and (2), using four alternative single-equation estimators: (1) the dynamic OLS method by Saikkonen (1991) ; (2) the autoregressive distributed lag modelling approach by Pesaran and Shin (1999) ; (3) the fully modi…ed OLS method by Phillips and Hansen (1990) ; and (4) the Engle and Yoo's (1991) three-step approach to the OLS-based Engle and Granger procedure. The lag speci…-cation of the models (as well as of the leads in the case of the dynamic OLS) is chosen using the Akaike Information Criterion. Tables 2 and 3 report the estimates of the long run coe¢ cients of the money demand functions for households and …rms, respectively, under the alternative functional speci…cations. The estimated long-run coe¢ cients for both the scale variable and the interest rate are statistically signi…cant at the conventional levels, regardless of the functional speci…cation or estimation procedure used. 8 The estimated coe¢ cients for any given functional estimators: (1) the authors' GLS corrected dynamic regression estimator, which is consistent under both the null of cointegrating regression and the alternative hypothesis of spurious regression; and (2) the dynamic OLS by Saikkonen (1991) , which is consistent under the null hypothesis only. In practice, the GLS corrected estimator is a …rst di¤erenced version of the dynamic OLS. 7 The test statistic for the log-log speci…cation of households (with four lags in levels) is 0.030; the corresponding statistic for …rms is 37.850. The test is distributed as 2 (2): critical values are 4.61 and 5.99 for the 10% and 5% signi…cance levels. The test is for the null hypothesis of cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of spurious regression. 8 Di¤erences in sample coverage and the de…nition of the variables diminish the information content of comparisons with previous studies. For instance, using a sample spanning the 1960-90 period Jain and Moon (1994) estimate the consumption elasticity of form tend to be consistent across estimators (though the ranges of the estimated coe¢ cients are slightly wider for …rms than for households), suggesting that the results are fairly robust to the choice of econometric methodology. The signs and magnitude of the coe¢ cients are in all cases consistent with the interpretation of the cointegrating vectors as equilibrium money demand relationships. Table 2 Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% critical levels, respectively. DOLS denotes the dynamic OLS by Saikkonen (1991) , ARDL the autoregressive distributed lag model by Pesaran and Shin (1999) , FMOLS the fully modi…ed method of Phillips and Hansen (1990) , and EY the Engle and Yoo's (1991) three-step Engle and Granger procedure. The number of lags (and leads for DOLS) in levels used for the estimation are speci…ed next to the estimator. Newey and West standard errors except in the case of FMOLS in which a quadratic spectral kernel is used.
household M1 holdings at 0.464, a value slightly below those reported in Table 2 . However, these authors'model includes a long-term rather a short-term interest rate. No evidence of cointegration is found for the corporate sector over the same sample period. An empirical study by Butkiewicz and McConnell (1995 ) over the 1952 sample period estimates the interest rate elasticity of the 3-month T-bill rate for the household sector at 0.103, slightly below our own estimates, but their model includes a di¤erent transaction variable (disposable personal income).
Based on this empirical exercise, we are able to estimate long-run money demand functions with statistically signi…cant and plausible coe¢ cients under the alternative functional forms for both the household and the corporate sector. However, given the relatively broad time span covered by the sample period, it is important to test for the stability of the sectoral money demand relationships before moving on to the computation of the welfare costs. For this purpose, we use the MeanF and SupF tests for cointegrated regression models -based on the mean and maximum, respectively, of Chow-type statistics for all possible break points -suggested by Hansen (1992) . The MeanF test is designed to detect gradual shifts over time that result in model instability, while the SupF test is more appropriate to reveal instability arising from an abrupt regime shift. Since the null hypothesis is stability, a low pvalue of the test statistic (say below 0.10) should be interpreted as indicative of parameter instability. In this empirical application, the tests are based on the fully modi…ed OLS estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3.   9   Table 3 . Long-run money demand functions of …rms Note: See note to Table 2 .
The results of the test indicate that the null hypothesis of joint parameter stability of the sectoral models cannot be rejected at the conventional signif-icance levels, suggesting that the models capture fairly stable relationships over the sample period considered. 
Welfare cost estimations
In this section, we estimate the welfare gains associated with the transition from a regime of high in ‡ation to one in which in ‡ation is stable at low levels. In order to calculate the welfare triangles, we use the estimates of the longrun coe¢ cients ; and in Tables 2 and 3 , and calibrate the values of the constants A and B so that they equal the average value over the sample of my r and my e r (as suggested by Lucas, 2000) . The estimated long-run coe¢ cients together with the constants de…ne the horizontal position and curvature of the money demand functions for each sector.
As mentioned earlier, if the elasticity of money with respect to the transaction variable is di¤erent from one, we also need to specify a value for the relevant scale variable. In order to ensure that the welfare calculations at di¤erent in ‡ation levels are time-independent, we set the level of the scale variables at their average value over the sample period. Substituting these values and the parameters of the money demand equations in (3) and (4), we can compute the welfare gains associated with a speci…c level of the interest rate.
At the height of the Great In ‡ation in 1980, the three-month T-bill rate stood at 15%. According to our estimates, the welfare cost of such level of the nominal interest rate for the US households ranged between 0.23% and 0.26% (depending on the estimator used) of annual personal consumption in perpetuity under a log-log function; and between 0.33% and 0.39% when a semi-log function is used (see Table 5 ). For US …rms, the welfare costs associated with a 15% nominal interest rate ranged between 0.16% and 0.24% of annual business GDP for the log-log function; and between 0.24% and 0.31% under the semi-log function (see Table 6 ). Table 5 Table 1 .
Following Volker's disin ‡ation in the early 1980s, the US economy gradually moved towards a regime of moderate and stable in ‡ation during which the nominal in ‡ation rate declined to low single-digit …gures. By 1999, the 3-month T-bill rate had decreased to around 5%. Our estimates suggest that the sectoral welfare gains from this favorable regime shift were non negligible. Indeed, we estimate that the welfare gains for households from the reduction in nominal interest rate from 15% to 5% amounted to between 0.14% and 0.16% (depending on the estimator used) of annual private consumption under a log-log function and to between 0.29% and 0.34% under a semi-log speci…cation. The welfare gains were also non-negligible for …rms: 0.09%-0.13% of business GDP under the log-log speci…cation compared to 0.21%-0.26% under the semi-log speci…cation. Table 2 .
How do our results compare with other recent studies, such as Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009) ? These studies typically report estimates of the welfare gains from reducing the in ‡ation rate from 10% to 0%. Assuming a steady-state real interest rate of 3% (broadly consistent with estimates of the natural interest rate at the end of the 1990s by Laubach and Williams, 2003) , this would be equivalent to estimating the welfare gains from bringing the nominal interest rate from r = 13% to r = 3%. Welfare measures are usually expressed as a fraction of the scale variable and studies focusing on the US economy as a whole typically refer to GDP. By contrast, in our study the welfare measures are expressed in terms of units of a smaller aggregate which represents the most relevant measure of the transaction volume for the sector under consideration (speci…cally, private consumption for households and business GDP for …rms). Thus, in order to compare our welfare measures with other studies, we …rst need to rescale them to GDP units. This is simply done by using the average ratio of each sectoral scale variable to GDP over the sample period. Table 7 presents the rescaled values of the sectoral welfare costs obtained using the DOLS procedure. Tables 2 and 3 . Values rescaled to GDP units using average ratio of consumption and business GDP to GDP over the sample period (64.8% and 78.0%, respectively).
We estimate the welfare gains for households from a ten percentage point reduction in the in ‡ation rate at 0.10% of US domestic output under a log-log function and at 0.16% under a semi-log speci…cation. The welfare gains for …rms are very similar: 0.09% of GDP annual under a log-log speci…cation and 0.15% under a semi-log function. Thus, once rescaled to a common measurement unit, the welfare gains across sectors from moving to the present low in ‡ation regime are estimated at very similar values. In addition, regardless of the sector considered, the estimated welfare gains from reducing in ‡ation are higher under a semi-log speci…cation than under a log-log functional form.
Since the household and the non-…nancial corporate sector together account for most of US money demand, the aggregation of welfare costs across these two sectors should provide a relatively close approximation of the costs for the economy as a whole. 11 Depending on the functional speci…cation used, we estimate the aggregate welfare gain from reducing the nominal interest rate from 13% to 3% at between 0.19% of annual GDP under the log-log form and 0.31% under the semi-log speci…cation. Thus, our estimates are fairly close to those reported by Ireland (2009) and Fischer (1981) : 0.25% and 0.30% of annual income, respectively; but signi…cantly below the value of 1% reported by Lucas (2000) .
A key source of the di¤erence in the estimated welfare cost is the value of the interest rate elasticity and semi-elasticity. Our empirical exercise for the log-log speci…cation suggests that Lucas's calibrated value of 0.5 is probably too high over our shorter but updated sample. Depending on the estimator used, we …nd that the interest rate elasticity of money demand is around 0.12-0.13 for households and between 0.18 and 0.27 for …rms. Thus, even our highest estimate of the more interest-rate sensitive sector is about half the value used by Lucas for the calibration of the US aggregate money demand. Also in the case of the semi-log function, we …nd that the value used by Lucas to calibrate his money demand function (7) is probably too high. In fact, all our estimates of the interest rate semi-elasticity for the household sector (ranging between 2.520 and 3.038) and most of those for the non-…nancial corporate sector (ranging between 4.558 and 6.280) are much smaller than Lucas'value. Similarly, di¤erences in sample coverage and estimated interest rate semi-elasticities may help to explain the (much smaller) gap between our estimates of welfare costs and those by Ireland (2009) . Indeed, using a shorter sample period than ours, Ireland estimates the aggregate interest rate semi-elasticity at close to 2.
Finally, Table 7 shows that the sectoral welfare costs associated with r = 3 are fairly small, particularly when the semi-log speci…cation is used. This …nding is consistent with Ireland's (2009) conclusion that, as far as shoeleather costs are concerned, the additional welfare improvements stemming from implementing a zero in ‡ation policy rather than targeting a low but still positive in ‡ation rate (as the Fed currently does) would be limited. 12 
Concluding remarks
This paper presents empirical estimates of the welfare cost of in ‡ation in the US economy in the spirit of the literature initiated by Bailey (1956) and Friedman (1969) and, more recently, revisited by Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2009) . This literature focuses on a speci…c source of in ‡ation-related welfare losses: the shoe-leather costs that arise when agents ine¢ ciently economise on their monetary balances for transaction purposes because of positive in‡ation.
The main innovation of the paper is to look at the issue from a sectoral perspective. Indeed, estimates of the welfare costs of in ‡ation are usually based on money demand functions for the economy as a whole. However, empirical evidence (e.g. Goldfeld, 1976, and Jain and Moon, 1994) shows that money demand behavior signi…cantly di¤ers across US sectors, suggesting that the application of Bailey's (1956) methodology to measure shoe-leather costs may yield di¤erent results across sectors.
Allowing for sectoral heterogeneity in the estimation of welfare costs of in ‡ation is potentially very important for policy purposes since it implies that di¤erent categories of agents may have diverging views on the welfare losses associated with living in a high in ‡ation environment or on the bene…ts stemming from moving to a low in ‡ation environment. In particular, US households and …rms may di¤erently value the permanent welfare bene…ts that they secured with the regime shift from the Great In ‡ation to the current environment of moderate and stable in ‡ation and interest rates.
We provide a quantitative assessment of the sectoral di¤erences in the welfare gains from such regime shift. In order to do so, we estimate di¤erent functional speci…cations of sectoral money demand for households and non…nancial …rms, using ‡ow of funds data covering four decades. Our estimates of the welfare gains for households amount to between approximately 1 6 % and 1 3 % of annual private consumption (depending on whether a log-log or a semi-log function is used) and for …rms between 1 9 % and 1 4 % of business GDP, thus suggesting that households might have bene…ted slightly more than …rms from the shift to the present low in ‡ation regime. However, once we rescale these …gures to a common transaction variable, the estimated sectoral welfare gains turn out to be of similar magnitude across sectors.
A limitation of this study is of course that, by focusing on the shoe-leather costs, it follows a partial-equilibrium approach to measuring the welfare costs of in ‡ation. Some authors (e.g. Dotsey and Ireland, 1996) have argued that, by looking only at a speci…c source of distortions, Bailey's (1956) approach may signi…cantly underestimate the true cost of in ‡ation. 13 It would be interesting to investigate in future research how the sectoral welfare costs of in ‡ation vary in a general equilibrium framework.
